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Abstract
There are reasons to attribute conceptual relativism to Wittgenstein. They are related mainly to his notion of grammar, its pos­
ited arbitrariness, theory of language games and forms of life intertwined with them. In his famous article On the Very Idea of a 
Conceptual Scheme,” Donald Davidson rejected conceptual relativism, questioning the very idea that various conceptual 
schemes exist. In my paper, I would like to consider how Davidson's arguments could be responded to. drawing on some of 
Wittgenstein’s findings.
There are reasons to attribute conceptual relativism to 
Wittgenstein. They are related mainly to his notion of 
grammar, its posited arbitrariness, theory of language 
games and forms of life intertwined with them.
In his famous article “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Scheme.” Donald Davidson rejected conceptual relativism, 
questioning the very idea that various conceptual schemes 
exist. Side by side with the analytical-synthetic division and 
the reductionist principle, this dualism is the third dogma of 
empiricism, which Davidson seeks to repudiate as Quine 
repudiated the first two.
In this paper. I would like to consider how Davidson's ar­
guments could be responded to. drawing on some of Witt­
genstein's findings.
To start with, let us recall that for Davidson having a 
conceptual scheme entails having a language, which 
means that where conceptual schemes differ, languages 
differ as well. Of course, it may well be that users of differ­
ent languages share the same conceptual scheme pro­
vided that these languages are mutually translatable. The 
disparity between conceptual schemes is bound up with 
their untranslatability; what is more, untranslatability is a 
necessary condition for differentiation of conceptual 
schemes. Davidson analyses two cases, namely, complete 
and partial untranslatability, only to assert that both cases 
are hopeless, which means that the dualism of scheme 
and content is impossible, as is, consequently, the stance 
of conceptual relativism. Complete untranslatability would 
take place if no meaningful part of sentences in one lan­
guage could be translated into another; partial untranslat­
ability, in turn, would be the case if some sentences could 
indeed be translated. As for the former, according to 
Davidson, if a form of activity cannot be interpreted in our 
language, it follows that it cannot be a linguistic behaviour 
altogether. (The defining criterion of languagehood is. 
then, translatability into our language.) This, however, is 
far from obvious. Wittgenstein consistently stressed the 
interconnectedness of language and our actions, or forms 
of life, viewing language as a part of human practice. Con­
sidering this, we can easily imagine, for example, that we 
arrive among a tribe whose members produce sounds 
which, given their tonality, we just cannot sort out into par­
ticular words. That notwithstanding, we can identify them 
as a language because the community members respond 
to them by taking or abandoning action, listening, answer­
ing, etc. Unlike Davidson, but in keeping with Wittgen­
stein’s emphasis on the links between language and ac­
tion, I believe that translatability into the language we know 
cannot be the only criterion of identity for language.
The dualism of scheme and content has been formulated 
in many various ways and species, but its general point is 
that
something is a language, and associated with a con­
ceptual scheme, whether we can translate it or not. if it 
stands in a certain relation (predicting, organizing, fac­
ing. or fitting) to experience (nature, reality, sensory 
promptings) The problem is to say what the relation is. 
(Davidson 1984. 191)
Davidson divides all metaphors into two groups: schemes 
either organise something or fit it. correspond to it As for 
entities which can be organised or which a scheme fits 
they may be either reality or experience Organising one 
object (the world, nature) is unclear to Davidson, as is or­
ganising experience, and it does not provide any other cri­
terion of languagehood but translatability Thus he has­
tens to proceed to the other metaphor, that is to the idea 
of fitting This concerns whole sentences because sen­
tences deal with things and fit reality or our sensory 
promptings and can be confronted with empirical evidence 
According to Davidson, the concept of fitting the totality of 
experience or facts does not contribute anything compre­
hensible to the concept of being true, which leads to a 
simple conclusion that a thing is an accepted scheme or 
theory if it is true. Davidson claims, however, that the con­
cept of truth cannot be understood if dissociated from the 
concept of translation. This is the key argument Davidson 
advances against complete untranslatability. thereby draw­
ing on Tarski’s definition of truth. Tarski's Convention T 
holds that a viable truth theory for language L must entail 
for every sentence in language L a sentence of the form s 
is true if, and only if, p,” where s is a name (a structural 
description) of sentence s. and p is a translation of this 
sentence into meta-language If. according to Davidson 
Tarski's Convention T embodies our best intuitions about 
the use of the concept of truth, then it is a futile venture to 
look for criteria that differ fundamentally from our schemes 
and assume dissociating the concept of truth from transla­
tion. It is. namely, difficult to imagine a language which 
would be untranslatable into another one and yet true 
Concluding, translatability is. thus, the criterion of identity 
for language.
As already mentioned. Davidson associates a concep­
tual scheme with language and. upholding Quine's refuta­
tion of the analytical-synthetic division, he rejects the no­
tion that theory and language could be separated As a 
result, he identifies language with theory, which does not 
seem right. First of all, language is not a totality of sen­
tences, but a set of syntactic and semantic rules used to 
produce sentences. Secondly, unlike theory, language 
does not anticipate anything. Even if we agreed that lan­
guage, like theory, was a totality of sentences rather than
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rules, we would still need to observe that language as 
such a totality of sentences would necessarily have to in­
clude also the negations of these sentences, which a co­
herent theory cannot possibly comprise (cf, Hacker 1996, 
297f; Glock 2008, 31). This difficulty is removed if a con­
ceptual scheme is compared not so much to language 
(theory) but to a grammar of a language. A language's 
grammar encompasses the use of expressions of that lan­
guage and not of non-natural (logical) propositions that 
hide behind everyday word-use and provide a necessary 
basis of all possible systems of representation. Grammar 
rules determine sense and precede the truth or falsity of 
sentences. At the same time. Wittgenstein stresses that 
there are various autonomous grammars, and their rules 
are as arbitrary as the choice of the units of measure. The 
rules do not speak anything about facts; nor are they true 
or false. Instead, they define the sense of that speaking. In 
this context, Hacker aptly notices that it would be more 
advisable to speak of conceptual schemes or grammars 
for particular areas, as in fact Wittgenstein did, focusing 
on, for example, the discourse of colours, space, size, time 
or truth and falsehood. This is, however, what Davidson 
refuses to do since he seeks to avoid all distinctions similar 
to the difference Wittgenstein formulated between “gram­
matical propositions,’' which determine sense or meaning, 
and empirical propositions, which describe the way things 
are in the world. As an argument against such divisions, 
Davidson cites Quine’s critique of analyticity, which was, 
however, originally targeted against Carnap first of all.
Let us now turn to partial untranslatability. In this case 
understanding the difference between conceptual 
schemes is made possible by referring to their shared part 
Davidson made a prior assumption that a person's speech 
cannot be interpreted without a knowledge about that per­
son’s beliefs (and also desires and intentions) and that 
identification of beliefs is impossible without understanding 
the language In case of "radical interpretation.'' that is 
translation from a language entirely unknown to us. we 
must by necessity assume a basic agreement on beliefs 
"We get a first approximation to a finished theory. " writes 
Davidson, “by assigning to sentences of a speaker condi­
tions of truth that actually obtain (in our own opinion) just 
when the speaker holds those sentences true" (Davidson 
1984, 196). Davidson refers to this as the "principle of 
charity.” By attributing maximum sense to words and 
thoughts of others, assuming that in most cases they are 
indeed right, we optimise agreement and the area of 
shared beliefs, thereby accommodating explicable errors 
and differences of opinion As a result. Davidson treats 
differences in conceptual schemes the way he does differ­
ences of beliefs: we make those differences more compre­
hensible by enlarging the basis of shared, that is translat­
able, language or opinion. “But,” as Davidson writes, 
“when others think differently from us, no general principle, 
or appeal to evidence, can force us to decide that the dif­
ference lies in our beliefs rather than in our concepts” 
(Davidson 1984. 197). Given this reasoning, we cannot 
make sense when we assert that two schemes are differ­
ent as we are unable to assess whether concepts or be­
liefs radically differ from ours. By the same token, the 
dogma of dualism of scheme and content collapses, and 
with it conceptual relativism does as well
We should also remember that maximization of agree­
ment postulated by the “principle of charity” probably can­
not be a theoretical act because if it were, it would be 
purely declarative and the attribution to others of beliefs 
resembling ours would not be underpinned by real prem­
ises. In §241 of Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein 
writes: “It is what human beings say that is true and false:
and they agree in the language they use. That is not 
agreement in opinions but in form of life." It is not exclu­
sively, not even primarily, in utterances that shared beliefs 
are manifested, but rather in action, in sensory and voli­
tional responses to certain stimuli from the environment 
and in interpersonal relationships. Davidson says that in­
terpretation of an alien language must commence from 
attributing to statements a person utters in this language 
truth conditions which indeed obtain when the statement is 
being uttered. But, as Hacker aptly notices, in what way 
the observer should identify assertions and separate them 
from imperatives or interrogations prior to understanding 
words or sentences is. as a matter of fact, rather puzzling. 
Davidson explicitly privileges truth over meaning.
However, in Davidson, the key problem as related to 
conceptual relativism is the claim that there is nothing to 
suggest that differences between us and natives in holding 
sentences to be true lie in different beliefs or judgments 
and not in the difference of concepts. In the language of 
the Piraha, there are no numbers, numerals or any forms 
of counting altogether. They basically use two words de­
noting more or less “a little” and “a lot.” but their use 
thereof is very peculiar. For example, they refer to two 
small fish and one medium-sized fish alike as “a little” and 
distinguish them from a tiger or a big fish. Given this it is 
really difficult to accept Davidson's distinction between 
“disagreement in beliefs" and “disagreement in concepts 
In the case of the Piraha use of “a little” and “a lot” we do 
not deal with new words, but rather with an anticipation of 
a different conceptual structure for a given bit of language. 
It can serve as an example of a partia! difference in con­
ceptual scheme, which is a difference between the corre­
sponding segments of the grammar of expressions for 
example the grammar of colour expressions or of numbers 
and counting. And this is not a difference in truth, but a 
difference in grammar. When the Piraha say that two small 
fish means the same as one medium-sized fish -  which in 
our grammar would mean that two equals one -  the dis­
agreement between us that is a disagreement about con­
cepts. does not produce a disagreement about truth What 
the Piraha say is true, but their truth is incommensurable 
with our truth It does not mean, either, that we are unable 
to understand their conceptual schemes for colours or 
numbers though, admittedly, we cannot translate them into 
ours. Hacker aptly notices that when trying to master the 
native language, an anthropologist not only engages in 
translation, as Quine's and Davidson's interpretations 
would suggest, but also wants to speak that language, that 
is. to understand the meanings of words. The anthropolo­
gist would then seek explanations, ostensive definitions 
examples, paraphrases, etc in the native language 
Hacker compared differences in concepts to differences in 
"measures” while the disagreement in beliefs or judgments 
to a disagreement in “measurements ” Consequently, he 
asks “Is it intelligible to claim that we can never allocate 
an apparent difference in judgment to a difference in the 
measure used, as opposed to a disagreement in the 
measurement executed7” (Hacker 1996 303) Let us recall 
the example of wood-sellers which Wittgenstein resorted to 
in his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics The 
wood-sellers pile up logs in heaps of varying heights and 
then sell them at the price proportionate to the area the 
heaps cover and not by the cubic meter How could we 
convince then that they make a mistake and that the big­
ger area that the pile covers does not entail “more wood 7 
We could. Wittgenstein proposes, arrange the pile which is 
small for them in such a way as to make it “big Perhaps 
that would convince them, but we might as well get to hear 
“Yes. it’s a lot of wood and it costs more ” And “that would 
be the end of the matter.” states Wittgenstein “We should
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presumably say in this case: they simply do not mean the 
same by a lot of wood' and a little wood’ as we do; and 
they have a quite different system of payment from us.” 
(Wittgenstein 1998, 94) At closer inspection, the example 
corresponds to the problem of partial translatability: the 
wood-sellers measure, count and sell, that is, they perform 
the same activities as we do, but they do it differently. “Dif­
ferently" means simply wrongly. Their mistake seems to lie 
in the choice of the measure which determines the mean­
ing "more wood" for them. It seems that it would be easy to 
convince them sooner or later that they are making a mis­
take. but it is in fact not the case, and Wittgenstein em­
phatically communicates that with the conclusive "That 
would be the end of the matter." Stating this, he meant, I 
guess, that although their activities are similar to ours, we 
do not understand them, in fact, and we do not know what 
they refer to when they use such expressions as “a lot of 
wood" and “a little wood.” Neither do we know whether 
what they do is indeed measuring and selling because, as 
a matter of fact, we know only very little about them: what 
do they do with the wood, how do they distribute other 
products, why do they pile wood into heaps’’  Their activity 
of measurement and calculation cannot be correct or incor­
rect as we do not know for sure whether they indeed 
measure and calculate, or at least we are not authorised to 
identify such actions. We are seduced by a certain image, 
perhaps by the unconsciously applied "principle of charity", 
which holds that there are beliefs and concepts whose 
meanings are independent of practices in which these 
concepts are applied. In such circumstances, we are prone 
to think that the concepts of measuring, counting and sell­
ing are already present in the language of the wood- 
sellers, but they are wrongly applied in practice. But the 
practice of the wood-sellers, which focuses only to the 
area covered by the piles and lacks the activities of meas­
uring and calculating the quantity of wood familiar to us, is 
not a practice in which measurement takes place.
Concluding, we could assume, I believe, that relativism 
is not unthinkable. Particularly when language is compre­
hended. the way it was by Wittgenstein, as a part of hu­
man forms of life, and the meaning of words as intertwined 
with our actions I think that responding to Davidson’s ar­
guments. Wittgenstein would emphasise this interconnec­
tion, teaching us in this way, to perceive differences rather 
than to agree on shared truth conditions.
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